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the creditor is otherwise entirely satisfied.8 Adherence to this rule requires
full satisfaction of the claim before subrogation can be granted; though it is
immaterial to what extent the surety is forced to 'contribute to the satisfaction.9
In other words, subrogation will not be granted where it will prejudice the
claim of the creditor who had the surety's assurance of payment.1 0 It is sub-
bitted that this policy of not allowing the surety to act in a manner detrimental
to the interests of the assured creditor should be the determinating factor in the
present case, and that the release should not be permitted to have the effect
of putting the released surety in the position to affect injuriously the releasing
creditor.1 1 Therefore, it appears that the court was correct in denying the
right of subrogation to the released surety until the entire claim which he
guaranteed was satisfied. R. E. M.
CONFLICT OF LAws-QUALiFICATION-The Burns Mortgage Company brings
an action on a promissory note, dated October 10, 1925, given by the
defendant Hardy in the state of Florida, and so executed under the laws of
that state to constitute a sealed instrument. Under the law of New Hampshire,
the state in which the action is brought, the instrument is not a contract under
seal. Section 3 of the New Hampshire statute of limitations provides that
personal actions shall be brought within six years after the cause of action
has accrued. The following section provides for a twenty-year period in which
to bring actions on contracts under seal. Defendant demurs on the ground that
the action is barred by Section 3 of the statute. HELD: Statutes of limitation
are local in character, and the statute of the forum, not that of the place of
contracting, governs. The note in suit, being a simple contract, and not a
specialty, falls under the six-year limitation provided by the New Hampshire
statute, and therefore action is barred in this jurisdiction. 1
The court determined that the New Hampshire statute of limitations should
apply to the action, as the lex fori governs in matters local in character.2 For
purposes of this discussion, that much of the decision will be assumed to be
8 Washington Township Board v. American Surety Co. (1932), 97 Ind. App.
45, 183 N. E. 492; Bank of Fayetteville v. Lorwein (1905), 76 Ark. 245, 88
S. W. 919; Knaffi v. Knoxville Bank & Trust Co. (1916), 133 Tenn. 655, 182
S. W. 232.
9 A partial payment of the debt even though it may be the full amount for
which the surety is bound does not give rise to a right of subrogation. Washing-
ton Township Board v. American Surety Co. (1932), 97 Ind. App. 45, 183 N. E.
492; United States v. National Surety Co. (1920), 254 U. S. 73, 41 S. Ct. 29;
McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co. (1917), 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787; Rice v.
Morris (1882), 82 Ind. 204.
lOBrowder & Co. v. Hill (1905), 69 C. C. A. 499, 136 F. 821; Bank of
Fayetteville v. Lorwein (1905), 76 Ark. 245, 88 S. W. 919.
11 In the case of Walters' Palm Toffee, Ltd. v. Walters (1933), Ch. Div.
321, the court said that plaintiff who had guaranteed payment of dividends
could be subrogated to the claim of the preferred stockholders who were paid
with his money. In this case, however, the preferred stockholders would not be
prejudiced; for there appeared to be sufficient earnings to pay the dividend
claim in full. Moreover, the statement was dicta.
1 Burns Mortgage Company, Inc., v. Hardy (District Court, D. New Hamp-
shire, 1937), 19 F. Supp. 287.
2 5 R. C. L. Sec. 197, p. 11.
RECENT C.4SE NOTES
correct.S The application by the court at the forum of a local remedial device,
however, presupposes a situation to which it is appropriate. The statute of
limitations of New Hampshire has, like most statutes of limitation, two pro-
visions, one of which provides for a six-year period in which to bring actions
on simple contracts, the other for a twenty-year period in which to bring
actions on contracts under seal. 4 Thus, the contract in the principal case must
be qualified-placed in its proper juristic pigeonhole-so that the pertinent
provision of the local statute can be applied.
The court apparently experienced no difficulty in taking care of this pre-
requisite. It applied the law of New Hampshire to the contract to determine
whether it was a sealed instrument or a simple contract, found it to be a
simple contract under that law, and applied the local statute of limitations to
it as such. The decision that the instrument was a simple contract, and that the
six-year section of the statute applied was evidently thought to be a necessary
result of the conclusion that the New Hampshire statute of limitations governed
the action. It is submitted that this is an over-simplification of the problem.-
The fact that a rule of law of the forum is characterized as procedural, or
local, justifies the court in applying it,5 but it does not explain the applica-
tion of the local law when it seeks qualification of the legal character of the
situation to which the local law is applied.6
It is necessary, in determining which of the provisions of the local statute
of limitations is to be applied to the instrument involved, first to determine, ac-
cording to the proper law, whether the contract is to be treated as a contract
under seal or as a simple contract.7 To determine what is the "proper" law
to deal with this question, it is first necessary to decide whether the distinction
between contracts under seal and simple contracts is one of procedure or one
of substance.8 If the New Hampshire law and the Florida law treat the dis-
tinction differently, the court must determine which law is applicable to decide
this preliminary question.O The majority of courts, it seems, adopt the criteria
3 It is interesting to note, however, that all statutes of limitation are not
considered as being procedural. See Story, Conflict of Laws (8th Ed., 1883),
Sec. 582; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927), Secs. 86 and 87.4 Public Laws of New Hampshire (1926), Secs. 3, 4.
5 Supra, note 2.
6 Supra, Note2.
7P. Arminjon, Precis de Droit International Prive, Vol. 1 (2d Ed., 1927),
Librairie Dalloz, p. 128 (Translation by Harper and Taintor in Cases on
Conflict of Laws, p. 224) ; Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and
the Conflict of Laws (1920), 20 Columbia L. Rev. 247; Etienne Bartin, De
L'Impossiblilite D'Arriver a Ia Suppression Definitive Des Conflicts de Lois,
Clunet (1897), pp. 225-255 (Translation by Harper and Taintor in Cases on
Conflict of Laws, pp. 253-257) ; H. L. McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1930), 78 University of Pennsylvania L. Rev.
933. (Note that in Bank of U. S. v. Donnally (1834-), 33 U. S. 361, 8 L. Ed.
974, and in Alrope Corporation v. Rossee (1936), 86 F. (2d) 118, relied upon
by the court in the principal case, this- question was decided according to the
law of the forum, without treatment separate from that of the question of
application of remedial law.)
8 McClintock, supra, note 7.
9 St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Cox (1926), 171 Ark. 103, 283 S. W. 31;
Wood and Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1930), 43 F. (2d)
941; Conflicts of Laws, Tentative Draft No. 5, Sec. 613 (c), "The forum,
in determining in accordance with its own law whether an element of a
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of the forum to determine this question. Is it not rather anomalous, however,
that the law of the forum should be applied to determine the classification of a
rule of law which is to be made applicable to a transaction which was com-
pletely consummated in another state, and which was necessarily signed, sealed,
and delivered according to the rules of law applicable in that state?O If the
law of the place of contracting, as is conceded in the principal case, determines
the nature, validity, construction, and effect of the instrumentll should it not
also determine whether the distinction which it makes between sealed instru-
ments and simple contracts is substantive or procedural in nature?1 2
On the assumption that the law of Florida treats the distinction as one of
substance, the next step is to look to the Florida law to determine the juristic
category into which the instrument should be placed.13 Under the law of
Florida, it is clear that the contract is to be treated as a sealed instrument.1 4
It seems, then, that it should be so considered by the court at the forum when
the statute of limitations of New Hampshire is applied. If, on the other hand,
the Florida law treats the distinction between simple contracts and contracts
under seal as a matter of procedure, there could be no technical objection to a
similar qualification under the New Hampshire law.
Since, by this process,' uniformity in result can be obtained, it would appear
to be a valid criticism of the instant case that the court ignored an important
question, upon the solution of which may depend that uniformity which it is
the function of Conflict of Laws to obtain. R. W. W.
CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF BREACH OF DUTY BY MINISTERIAL OFFICER-
SENTENCES OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS-On June 2, 1930, the federal court
convicted the petitioner of impersonating a federal officer, sentenced him to six
years in prison, and issued a warrant for his commitment on the same day,
directing the marshal to deliver him to the United States penitentiary "forth-
with." The marshal neglected to carry out the order, retained custody of the
prisoner, and later over the protests of the petitioner turned him over to state
authorities who had previously filed an information (on May 14, 1930) charging
forgery against him. The state arraigned him for trial, and on July 31, 1930,
foreign transaction is matter of substance or procedure, will examine the
entire nature of the transaction, including the statute or principal of law which
created the alleged right and the interpretation thereof; but will not inquire
whether the foreign court will call the various rules involved in the transaction
substantive or procedural." But observe in, note 10, the comment by McClintock
on this section. The final draft of the Restatement materially rephrases this
section.
1o McClintock, supra, note 7, says, "The statement of the comment that the
forum 'will not enquire whether the foreign court would call the various rules
involved in the transaction substantive of procedural' is manifestly contrary
to the general theory of the Restatement that in the field of conflict of laws
one deals principally with the jurisdiction of states to create rights and the
enforcement of the rights so created in other jurisdictions."; Burns Mortgage
Co. v. Fried (1934), 292 U. S. 487, 54 S. Ct. 813; Precort v. Driscoll (1931), 85
N. H. 280, 157 A. 525; Halsey v. McLean (1816), 94 Mass. 438.
11 Supra, note 2.
12 Supra, note 10.
13 Supra, note 2.
14 Compiled General Laws Florida, 1927, Secs. 5704, 5705.
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